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Nathaniel Persily
After the district court issued its judgment in McConnell v. fEC,'
two familiar sayings competed in the race to become the decision's
descriptive sound bite: "Be careful what you wish for," and "When
you have three lawyers in a room, you end up with four opinions."
Since November of last year, those of us who study campaign finance
have been waiting and wondering when the district court would issue
its opinion on the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act ("BCRA"). 2 Now, six months after they heard arguments in
the case, the three judges have given us four opinions totaling 1638
pages.
My remarks will focus on the constitutional controversy surround-
ing the BCRA's soft money provisions and the district court's at-
tempted resolution of it.3 Two questions appear to be at the heart of
this controversy. First, is the BCRA a law about corporations and un-
ions or is it about political parties? The answer, of course, is that the
law is about both, but the constitutionality of the law may depend on
whether the Court focuses on the source of soft money rather than
the fact that parties receive and spend it. Second, how should one
think of corruption when it comes to political parties? Defining cor-
ruption is troublesome enough in the abstract, but when political
parties enter the mix, they complicate the model of undue influence
that has emerged from the precedent.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS CONCERNING THE SOFrT MONEY
PROVISIONS
Before asking these questions, it is worth reviewing briefly how the
district court handled the soft money provisions. As several partici-
pants in this symposium have explained, the district court delivered a
mixed bag when it came to the soft money provisions. Two judges
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3 Elsewhere I have discussed the specific provisions of the BCRA and the likelihood of suc-
cess of the constitutional challenges. See Nathaniel Persily, Soft Money and Slippery Slopes, 1
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(Judge Leon and Judge Henderson) found that individuals, corpora-
tions, and labor unions had a constitutional right to contribute
unlimited amounts of money to political parties, while two judges
(Judge Leon and Judge Kollar-Kotelly) found that the Constitution
allows the government to ban parties' use of such money to fund ac-
tivities that directly influence federal elections, specifically election-
eering ads as defined by the law and redefined by Judge Leon. In
short, Judge Leon's tie-breaking opinion concluded that a threat of
real or apparent corruption arises only from parties' channeling of
soft money into activities that directly affect election outcomes, but
no such threat arises from the parties' mere receipt of such funds or
spending of such funds on activities other than electioneering com-
munications. Thus, the court's decision split the soft money baby:
telling parties they can have all the soft money they want, but they
cannot spend it anyway they wish.
Many in this symposium have criticized the district court's "resolu-
tion" of the soft money issue, but the judges' distinctive approaches
highlight the inherent difficulties the precedent presents in charac-
terizing soft money. Soft money stands at the intersection of almost
every vague and contested concept in campaign finance law: the dif-
ference between expenditures and contributions, the definition of
corruption, and the special constitutional character of political par-
ties. The BCRA soft money provisions, on the one hand, appear as
restrictions on contributions because they limit (indeed, ban) an en-
tity's ability to contribute money to political parties. On the other,
they appear like an expenditure restriction because they also prohibit
a party from spending soft money on federal election activity. In ad-
dition, these provisions highlight the case law's conflicting definitions
of corruption: one used in the special context of corporate political
activity, another used for "run-of-the-mill" corruption. Normally, cor-
ruption is viewed as a contributor's "improper influence" over an of-
ficeholder; however, in the context of corporate contributions and
expenditures, corruption morphs into "the corrosive and distorting
effects" on elections caused by corporate political participation. Fi-
nally, soft money, because it is party money, brings to the forefront
the question whether political parties deserve special constitutional
treatment or whether they should be treated just like other associa-
tions in the campaign finance system. These cleavages in the case law
emerged and distinguished the district courtjudges' conflicting opin-
ions.
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
5 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
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II. IS THE BCRA ABOUT CORPORATIONS OR IS IT ABOUT POLITICAL
PARTIES?
The soft money ban is like a hologram that appears to change as
you walk by it: what one sees in the law depends on one's point of
view. Its constitutionality may depend on whether one views the ban
principally as a restriction on corporations and unions (and therefore
likely to be upheld) or as a restriction on political parties (in which
case it is more likely to be struck down). There is no question as to
what the law does: it bans corporations and unions from making
contributions to federal party committees from their treasuries,6 and
it bans the parties' use of those prohibited funds for electioneering
activities. Yet, focusing on the source of the funds may lead to a dif-
ferent constitutional result than focusing on the recipient of them.
If one views the BCRA principally as a restriction on corporations
and unions, then the relevant cases are Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,7 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,8 and, now, FEC v.
Beaumont.9 Those cases together stand for the proposition that, with
respect to candidate elections, corporate (and union) contributions
and even expenditures may be banned. Because corporations are, to
some extent, state-created entities with state-conferred advantages,
such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable tax treatment,
the First Amendment does not require that they be treated identically
to individuals. Moreover, the Court has recognized a special corrup-
tion danger arising when corporate directors, unlike an individual or
leader of a political association, contribute money from people
(namely, shareholders) who do not support the candidate receiving
the contribution. Instead of the typical "improper" or "undue influ-
ence" that appears in cases from Buckley'0 to Nixon," Austin described
the special kind of corporate-sponsored corruption as "the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac-
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas." 2
6 The soft money restrictions also limit individuals' contributions to political parties-a fact
that usually receives less attention. This raises additional issues which will be discussed in the
next section.
7 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
8 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
9 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003).
10 Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 (1976) (per curiam).
I Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
12 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (1990). I should note that the corporate corruption definition has
been assumed to apply to unions as well, although one might question whether the arguments
as to the unique structure and threat of corporations should apply to unions. See Persily, supra
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The corporate exception to the general notion of corruption is
limited by Bellotti to candidate elections, however. Emphasizing the
importance to the listener, rather than the speaker, of the informa-
tion presented and paid for with independent expenditures, Bellotti
stands for the proposition that corporations may spend as much as
they wish on initiative campaigns, and presumably genuine issue ad-
vocacy. The Court there did not preoccupy itself with the excessive
influence or special organizational nature of corporations, but fo-
cused rather on the value of the information corporations conveyed
to potential voters.
The tension in the corporate campaign finance case law explains
the differences between Judge Kollar-Kotelly's and Judge Leon's
opinions. Judge Kollar-Kotelly applied Austin's logic to political par-
ties' acceptance and spending of corporate contributions: if corpo-
rate expenditures in support of candidates present a unique threat of
"corrosion" or corruption, as Austin recognized, then the same
should be true of corporate contributions to parties. After all,
elected officials direct the party committees, and contributions to the
party have the intent and effect of improving party nominees' elec-
toral prospects. Judge Leon took a different approach and split the
soft money "issue" into two stages. He found that Bellotti controlled
the use of corporate money on anything except campaign activity di-
rectly benefiting a candidate. Contributions to parties, by themselves,
do not r9ise the specter of Austin-style corruption because such funds
might be used for any number of activities unrelated to a candidate's
election. Bellotti protects corporate contributions as they move
through the system until they are spent directly for the candidate's
benefit. Then, Austin kicks in and allows the state to prohibit the use
of corporate funds to advocate for the election or defeat of a candi-
date.
Unlike those who viewed the soft money ban as governed almost
completely by the corporate-campaign finance case law, Judge Hen-
derson saw the case law concerning political party autonomy and as-
sociational rights as more relevant. Thus, like the plaintiffs, she saw
the soft money ban as a restriction on political parties that invaded
their core First Amendment rights of expression and association. Be-
cause soft money supports "party-building" activities, the argument
goes, restricting it impairs the party's functions without any justifica-
tion concerning corruption of candidates, a la Austin. By this logic,
all contributions from any entity to political parties are constitution-
ally protected, but the state may regulate transfers of funds to candi-
dates and perhaps the parties' spending of corporate and union
note 3, at 413. To my knowledge and dismay, no party to the litigation is making the argument
that unions should be treated differently than corporations.
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funds on express advocacy (which for Judge Henderson is limited to
ads that use the magic words). No corruption threat arises, under
this view, so long as the candidate does not receive corporate funds
or does not otherwise directly benefit from corporate contributions
to the party.
III. CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL PARTIES
This discussion of the party-centric view of the BCRA ties into an-
other set of issues surrounding the concept of corruption as applied
to political parties. Preventing corruption or preventing the appear-
ance of corruption remain the only state interests the Supreme Court
has permitted as justifications for limiting campaign contributions or,
in the case of corporations, expenditures. However, the Court has
not yet had occasion to consider the basic question as to whether
contributions to political parties can be limited. Thus, one of the
central questions surrounding the BCRA-whether corporate and
union contributions to political parties can be banned and whether
individual contributions to them can be limited-remains unan-
swered, despite the fact that the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA") regime that existed before the discovery of the soft money
loophole apparently did both. The case law gives us some hints as to
how the Court might view this problem.
In applying the concept of corruption that emerges from the
precedent for the BCRA litigation, it might be useful to conceive of
three different types of corruption involving political parties: corrup-
tion of the party, corruption by the party, and corruption through
the party. I have depicted these different types of corruption in the
Figure below.
FIGURE 1: CORRUPTION OF, BY, AND THROUGH THE PARTY
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A. Corruption by the Party
From the two Supreme Court party-campaign finance decisions
involving the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,'
3
three basic positions have emerged on the Court. The prevailing
view of Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Breyer treats political parties
as just another species of interest groups, deserving no special consti-
tutional protections nor subject to special burdens. Thus, the deci-
sive plurality on the Court has interpreted the First Amendment as
guaranteeing a party's right to make unlimited independent expendi-
tures in support of a candidate' 4 while allowing restrictions on contri-
butions from the party to the candidate that serve to combat real or
apparent corruption.' The two other camps on the Court treat po-
litical parties as having a special role in campaigns and a unique rela-
tionship to candidates that earns them different treatment than other
groups.' 6 For Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Tho-
mas, and Scalia, parties' special relationship or "practical identity of
interests' 7 between parties and candidates argues for greater First
Amendment protection of political parties, since their speech is con-
stitutionally indistinguishable from that of their candidates. For Jus-
tices Stevens and Ginsburg, in contrast, this special relationship justi-
fies greater regulation of parties by the government due to the risk of
corruption by the party. As Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in
Colorado Republican I, the "interdependency [between a party and a
candidate] creates a special danger that the party-or the persons
who control the party-will abuse the influence it has over the candi-
date by virtue of its power to spend."18
For those who view parties as indistinctive actors in the campaign
finance system, parties are capable of corrupting candidates just as an
individual contributor or association could. Thus, according to Jus-
tice Stevens,' 9 a special danger of corruption by the party exists because
13 SeeColo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) ("Colorado Repub-
lican I); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ("Colorado Repub-
lican H").
14 See Colorado Reublican , 518 U.S. at 608.
15 See Colorado Republican I, 533 U.S. at 437.
16 Colorado Republican I 518 U.S. at 648 (StevensJ., dissenting).
17 Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 630 (KennedyJ, concurring and dissenting).
Is Colorado Republican 1, 518 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The FEC put forth this no-
tion of corruption-by-parties in the Colorado Republican litigation, but the majority on the Court
based its decision on the corruption-through-parties (or conduit corruption) rationale. See
Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 456 n.18.
19 Colorado Republican 1, 518 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also FEC v. Colo. Repub-
lican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1243 (10th Cir. 2000) (Seymour, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the FEC's argument that "limits on party contributions are necessary to prevent
unscrupulous party officials from furthering their pet interests, thereby corrupting or appearing
to corrupt the legislative process.").
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the party is in a particularly good position to use its financial clout to
unduly influence the positions taken by its candidates. Again, for
those who see such a corruption danger, the original source of the
parties funds (a corporation, union, individual, or bake sale) that in-
fluence a candidate is irrelevant: the problem arises merely from the
real or apparent danger that the candidate may feel beholden to the
party or its leaders because of the contributions he received.
Although this argument has its proponents in the FEC, on the
Supreme Court, and among the defendants in the BCRA litigation,
none of the district court opinions rests on the notion that parties
can corrupt their candidates. Nonetheless, the current jurispru-
dence, which treats political parties almost as if they were SuperPACs
capable of corrupting contributions and uncorrupting independent
expenditures, suggests that parties, like other participants in the
campaign finance system, can exert undue influence over their can-
didates. Of course, parties exist to exert "undue" or special influence
over candidates both during the election campaign and once in of-
fice, such that the analogy to other groups fits uncomfortably. Never-
theless, proponents of the BCRA view the huge expenditure of party
money on express advocacy, which has grown almost geometrically
with each recent election, as a problem in and of itself. The awesome
financial power of parties, under this view, threatens the independ-
ence of legislators and can tip the balance in favor or against a deci-
sion to take official action on legislation. With the power to pull the
plug on a candidate's campaign by refusing to spend soft money in
the race may come the power to induce an elected official to toe the
party line when her conscience or constituents might lead to a differ-
ent result.
B. Corruption through the Party
The majority in Colorado Republican H and both Judge Leon and
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's opinions in McConnell concentrated on a dif-
ferent type of corruption: corruption through the party. Such corrup-
tion occurs when the parties become conduits for contributor influ-
ence: the contributor uses the party as a means to "corrupt" a
candidate. As the Court in Colorado Republican II described this type
of corruption:
[W]hether they like it or not, [parties] act as agents for spending on be-
half of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders .... [T] his
party role, which functionally unites parties with other self-interested po-
litical actors.., provides good reason to view limits on coordinated
spending by parties through the same lens applied to such spending by
[Vol. 6:1
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donors, like PACs, that can use parties as conduits for contributions
20meant to place candidates under obligation.
Under this view, the party becomes a mere way station for money
given by contributors seeking to gain influence over obligated office-
holders. Corruption through the party occurs when money given to the
party is funneled to the candidate and everyone involved knows the
identity and intentions of the contributor.
In the BCRA litigation, the corruption-through-the-party argu-
ment served to justify limits on both soft money contributions to the
party and soft money expenditures by the party. In the pre-BCRA
world, according to the defendants and Judge Kollar-Kotelly, corpo-
rations, unions, and individuals would give soft money donations to
the parties and the parties would spend that money on behalf of spe-
cific candidates on various federal election activities, including can-
didate specific ads that did not use the "magic words." If laws ban-
ning corporate and union expenditures on such activities are
constitutional, as the BCRA proponents argue, it should also be con-
stitutional to prevent parties from becoming the instruments of cor-
porate and union spending for the benefit of candidates. Similarly,
since limits on individuals' contributions to a candidate are constitu-
tional, limits on individuals' contributions to parties prevent evasion
of the candidate limits by restricting how much any given individual
can funnel into the party for a candidate's benefit. For the BCRA's
defenders and Judge Kollar-Kotelly, then, closing off both ends of the
party conduit to corporate and union money and narrowing both
ends of the conduit for individual contributions can be justified by
the same anti-corruption rationales that support limits on contribu-
tions and bans on certain expenditures.
Because Judge Leon considered most corporate and union in-
volvement in federal election activity constitutionally protected (ex-
cept for express advocacy as he (re)defined it), he viewed party
spending of soft money on those activities as unproblematic. Conduit
corruption can occur, under this view, only if the candidate directly
benefits from the funds given to the party. Incidental benefits the
candidate might receive from party spending of soft money on such
activities as voter registration and mobilization do not present a dan-
ger of real or apparent conduit corruption: the candidate allegedly
will not feel beholden to a contributor whose money principally
benefits the party and only indirectly benefits the candidate.
For Judge Henderson and the plaintiffs, no risk of conduit cor-
ruption justifies cutting off the flow of any money into and out of the
party. They viewed money that goes into the party and is not coordi-
20 Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 452.
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nated with or contributed to the candidate as immune from any po-
tential for corruption. Therefore, despite the fact that corporate do-
nations to the party might be spent on electioneering communica-
tions (minus the magic words), such election-related activities by the
party were as constitutionally protected as independent expenditures.
The conduit corruption argument only held, under this view, if the
party used soft money for express advocacy with the magic words, for
coordinated expenditures with the candidate, or for contributions to
the candidate.
Each of the district court opinions made the mistake of treating
corporate and union soft money donations to the political parties the
same as individual soft money donations. Until now, I have generally
referred to soft money as consisting of large corporate and union do-
nations to a party. However, what we generally describe as "soft
money" or "non-federal money" also includes individual contribu-
tions to the political party that exceeded the previous FECA limits but
which the party spent on so-called "party building" activities, includ-
ing electioneering communications that excluded magic words. It is
important to distinguish individual contributions from corporate and
union contributions because, as noted above, a different definition
and threat of corruption applies to individuals and corporations or
unions. An individual, unlike a corporation or union, has a constitu-
tional right to spend unlimited funds on express advocacy.
When it comes to conduit corruption, one should first ask
whether the source of the money that flows into the political party
but flows out as an independent expenditure could be prohibited
from making the same expenditures on its own. In other words, as-
suming the First Amendment, along with the special corruption
threat of corporate corrosion of the political process, allows for regu-
lation of corporate express advocacy according to the BCRA defini-
tion, then the party's spending of corporate money could give rise to
the same corruption threat and be similarly regulable. The same
would not be true for the party's spending of individual soft money
contributions, however, because individuals could spend the money
on such prohibited activities themselves. Given that individuals can
make unlimited independent expenditures on most activities the
BCRA defines as "federal election activity," it is unclear why the threat
of conduit corruption (i.e., using the party as a backchannel to
achieve otherwise forbidden aims) could justify limiting a party's
spending of large individual contributions. It may be true, in reality,
that regulating large individual contributions to political parties pre-
vents circumvention of the individual contribution limits because
party express advocacy is tantamount to a contribution. But so long
as the Court adheres to Buckley's distinction between contributions
and expenditures, the individuals' use of the party conduit for pur-
poses other than contributions to candidates would seem to be con-
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stitutionally protected.2'
For similar reasons, one would suspect that corporations and un-
ions do not enjoy a constitutional right to funnel money into a party
for activities prohibited if done directly by those same corporations or
unions. Yet the argument might not be as straightforward as it first
appears. As noted above, the rationale for limiting corporate express
advocacy depends on the special nature of corporations as beneficiar-
ies of state benefits (limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable tax
treatment), as having access to shareholder money (i.e., money that is
not the directors' and was not intended to be used for politics), and,
more amorphously, as giving rise to a unique corruption or "corro-
sion" threat given their immense aggregation of wealth. Some of
these characteristics of corporations are mitigated, however, when
corporate money is filtered through the party conduit. Although
through winks and nods the corporate contributor may be able to
"direct" the party to pay for ads that benefit a certain candidate, the
ultimate control over the corporation's donations would lie with the
party. Were the Court to view a party as having real control over cor-
porate donations, then perhaps the "normal," rather than corporate,
corruption test becomes relevant. If so, then a party's independent
expenditures of corporate money are immune from state regulation
for the same reasons they were in Colorado Republican I.
The Court's decisions in Buckley and California Medical Association
v. FEC' may undermine the argument presented here, however. Al-
though the Supreme Court has never explicitly upheld a limit on
contributions to political parties, Buckley upheld FECA's $25,000 limit
on the total amount an individual could contribute to candidates and
political committees. The Court found the restriction justified as
preventing evasion of the individual contribution limits: "[T]his
quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to pre-
vent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who
might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular
candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political
committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contribu-
21 To a certain extent this argument assumes that there is a constitutional right to make an
earmarked contribution to a party. In other words, an individual can contribute as much as he
wants to a party for purposes of independent expenditures, but an individual can be limited in
the amount of money that he can give to a party that could then be directly transferred to a
candidate. This would suggest that a party has a constitutional right to receive unlimited indi-
vidual contributions but that the state can limit the amount that can genuinely be funneled
through the party directly to the candidate. FECA and the BCRA do so by restricting the
amount of money a party can contribute or coordinate with a candidate, thereby closing off the
back end of the conduit.
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
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tions to the candidate's political party."23 The Court adopted the
same rationale in California Medical Association with respect to FECA's
limits on individual contributions to PACs. The plurality opinion ex-
pressed the view that such limits were necessary to prevent the use of
PACs as conduits for contributions to candidates. However, Justice
Blackmun's critical concurrence explicitly distinguished the case of a
PAC used as a conduit for contributions from one in which the or-
ganization receiving the contribution limited itself to independent
expenditures.24 Contributions to the latter were protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, we are left without a specific answer to the ques-
tion whether contributions given to a party for independent expendi-
tures along the lines banned by the BCRA can be limited based on
the possible threat of conduit corruption.
One other complication with the corruption through parties argu-
ment needs to be mentioned, although so far as I can tell this has not
been articulated by anyone in the litigation. The conduit corruption
argument cannot justify regulating the party conduit from both ends
at the same time. In other words, if the laws shuts off one end of the
party conduit then there is no anti-corruption justification left for
shutting down the other end. Assume, for example, that the Court
upholds the BCRA's ban on parties' spending soft money on federal
election activities. How can it simultaneously appeal to the notion of
conduit corruption to justify preventing soft money contributions to
parties? Once the back end of the conduit (that is, from the party to
the candidate) is closed with a prohibition on soft money expendi-
tures, then no conduit corruption rationale remains to justify depriv-
ing the party of soft money to be used on other activities.
C. Corruption of the Party
To justify regulation of contributions to political parties, defend-
ers of the BCRA do not rest their argument merely on the possibility
that such contributions will be transferred (directly or indirectly) to
candidates through the party conduit. Rather, a danger of real or
apparent corruption of the party justifies limiting the sources and
amounts of contributions to parties. Parties can be corrupted just
like candidates, under this view: a contributor gives money and gets
(or appears to get) official benefits in return. Just as the corruption by
the party argument does not depend on the source of the money the
party spends or contributes, though, this converse argument does not
depend on what the party does with the contributions once it receives
them. Simply stated, the argument suggests that soft money con-
23 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
2 Cal. Med. Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
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tributors gain undue influence over the party because of their contri-
butions.
Of the three district court judges hearing McConnell v. FEC, only
Judge Kollar-Kotelly appeared to buy the corruption of the party argu-
ment. For her, soft money contributors gained undue influence over
governing officials as a result of their contributions, and the public
perceived them as having such undue influence. Judge Leon and
Judge Henderson rejected the argument and thus struck down all
limits on contributions to political parties. As stated above, they only
saw corruption when contributions were filtered through the party
directly for a candidate's benefit. In a rare moment of harmony be-
tween them, though, all three judges agreed in upholding the ban on
elected federal officials raising soft money, because such contribu-
tions raised the same corruption concerns as direct contributions to a
candidate.
The difficulties in describing and analyzing the allegation that soft
money corrupts parties arise from a disagreement as to who actually
is corrupted by the soft money contribution and why they pay the
contributor back with official favors. On its face, the analogy to indi-
vidual candidate corruption has simplistic appeal: in each case
money exchanges hands and the contributor gets paid back (or ap-
pears to get paid back) with official favors. Yet, it is quite difficult to
discern exactly what we mean when we say that the "party" pays back
soft money contributors. Presumably, we mean that elected officials
change their official behavior (for example, positions or votes on
bills) as a result of the contribution. To use V.O. Key's categorization
of parties, 25 we mean that members of the party-in-government (that
is, elected officials) perform official acts in return for contributions to
the party organization (for example, the Democratic National Com-
mittee, or the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee).26
However, these officials perform these services not for their own
benefit, but for the benefit of the party. Their other-regarding be-
havior moves this type of corruption farther away from the paradig-
matic cases of bribery or quid pro quo and closer to other types of po-
litical influence.
25 SeeV.O. KEYJR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 163-65 (5th ed. 1964) (separat-
ing the concept of party into the party-in-government, party-in-the-electorate, and party organi-
zation); see also Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassess-
ment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 778-79 (2000) (discussing Key's
categories).
26 In theory, the party organization itself could pay a contributor back by giving the con-
tributor access and influence over party operations, by allowing the contributor to place a
thumb on the scales when it comes to nominating decisions, or by changing a platform plank
according to the contributor's wishes (e.g., dropping handgun reform from the platform once
the NRA ponies tip).
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Moreover, it is somewhat difficult to discern what is meant by a
contributor's "undue influence" over a party. The notion of "undue
influence," difficult enough to define when it comes to candidates,
becomes even more complicated when one tries to assess the baseline
amount of influence an individual or party member should have over
a political party. Political parties are quintessentially inegalitarian in-
stitutions: interest groups often gain influence over a party organiza-
tion disproportionate to their membership in the party electorate.
Moreover, parties receive contributions totaling hundreds of millions
of dollars, such that a $100,000 contribution would carry much less
influence with the party than it would with the average House candi-
date who spends less than $1 million on a campaign.
I do not want to overstate the argument against the notion of cor-
ruption of parties. It may be the case that giving money to parties is the
most efficient way to gain influence over policy. A check that makes
its way with implicit directives (e.g., "use this money to support pro-
tobacco candidates") to the chair of the party's congressional cam-
paign committee can be used across a range of elections to support
many candidates that share the contributor's views. Moreover, given
the other threats and incentives party leaders have at their disposal to
coerce compliance among members of the party in the legislature,
gaining influence with such leaders through party contributions is a
better use of a contributor's resources. A contribution to a candidate
might "get" the contributor one vote, but a contribution directed to-
ward a party leader, who can whip the other members of his party,
might get the contributor several dozen votes.
Nevertheless, as with each form of "corruption" discussed here,
this critique of party financing is as much a critique of political par-
ties as it is of campaign finance. For those who suggest that parties
corrupt candidates (corruption by the party), the use of money to exert
influence over candidates is not qualitatively different than offering
coveted committee assignments, party endorsements, or the like.
The problem, if there is one, is with the party's influence over its
members. Similarly, for those who see corruption of the party from soft
money contributions, their fear of undue influence would apply
equally to powerful, but often poorly funded, party factions that can
"capture" the party. Perhaps those who see today's parties as money
launderers (corruption through the party) do not have a problem with
parties as institutions, but rather have nostalgia for a type of party
that is more autonomously engaged in politics at the grass roots level.
One might wonder whether those party machines of yesteryear,
which thrived on patronage but certainly mobilized their base, were
less corrupt than today's parties.
[Vol. 6:1
CONTESTED CONCEP7S IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
This is not to say that financial influence is identical to other types
of influence; good arguments can be made that "money is differ-
ent."27 Rather, I am suggesting that the very purpose of a party is to
be the repository and agent of "undue influence." Political parties
are not microcosms of a larger democracy, and they are not merely
one species of associations. They exist as complicated arrangements
of interest groups in which a group's intensity of preferences and re-
sources count as much as its size.28 They are also in a unique position
of influence with respect to the candidates that run under the party's
label in the general election. It may very well be the case that large
contributors unduly influence political parties, that parties unduly in-
fluence their candidates, and that parties serve as indirect avenues of
influence over candidates by contributors. Ultimately, though, the
arguments in favor of party finance reform may say more about
Americans' historic dislike of factions and parties and reveal a hope
that parties will play less of a role in politics and elections in the fu-
ture.
27 See Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1617 (1999).
28 See Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750,
810-11 (2001).
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